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Abstract
Multiple observers who interact with environmental encodings of the states of a
macroscopic quantum system S as required by quantum Darwinism cannot demon-
strate that they are jointly observing S without a joint a priori assumption of a
classical boundary separating S from its environment E . Quantum Darwinism can-
not, therefore, be regarded as providing a purely quantum-mechanical explanation of
the “emergence” of classicality.
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1 Introduction
Quantum Darwinism (QD) [1, 2, 3] is an ambitious and detailed program to explain the
“emergence” of an objective, classical world from minimal quantum mechanics alone. The
QD program has three components: (1) einselection of a pointer basis for any system of
interest S by decohering interactions with the surrounding environment E [1, 4, 5]; (2)
“witnessing” of the eigenstates of S in the einselected pointer basis by states of E [6, 7];
and (3) redundant encoding of the environmentally-witnessed eigenstates of S in multiple,
disjoint fragments of E that are accessible to multiple independent observers [1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8].
Consistent with a conception of minimal quantum mechanics as an “ultimate theory that
needs no modifications to account for the emergence of the classical” ([8], p. 1), einselection,
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environmental witnessing and redundant encoding of pointer states are proposed by QD to
fully account for the existence of “objective” physical properties, defined by Ollivier, Poulin
and Zurek (OPZ) as follows:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
(p. 1 of [6]; p. 3 of [7])
That this OPZ definition of “objective” properties is intended to characterize the observable
properties of not only microscopic quantum systems but also the macroscopic quantum
systems composing the everyday world is stated explicitly: “quantum Darwinism provides
a satisfying explanation of the emergence of the objective classical world we perceive from
the underlying quantum substrate” (p. 19 of [7]); “quantum Darwinism accounts for the
transition from quantum fragility (of information) to the effectively classical robustness”
(p. 189 of [3]); “[Q]uantum Darwinism ... explains the emergence of objectivity, as it allows
many initially ignorant observers to independently obtain nearly complete information and
reach consensus about the state of the system” (p. 1 of [9]; see also [10, 11, 12] and from a
more philosophical perspective [5, 8, 13]).
This paper accepts the OPZ definition of objectivity as providing an operational definition
of “emergence” as this term is commonly understood in discussions of the emergence of
classicality from an underlying quantum “reality” described by fully-deterministic unitary
dynamics (for review see [11]). It then asks whether the physical mechanisms proposed
by QD, namely einselection, witnessing of einselected eigenstates by the environment, and
redundant encoding of environmentally-witnessed eigenstates are sufficient to render the
“properties” of a macroscopic quantum system represented by its einselected eigenstates
“objective” in the sense defined by OPZ. This question is framed operationally: is it pos-
sible for two observers O1 and O2 to “arrive at a consensus” about the eigenstates of a
macroscopic quantum system S given only quantum-mechanical descriptions of S and its
states and only quantum-mechanical methods for discovering further information about S,
and is it possible for them to do this “without prior knowledge” and “without prior agree-
ment” about S or its states? It is shown that the answer to this operational question is
“no”: even if provided with a Hilbert-space decomposition HS ⊗HE , two observers O1 and
O2 must by prior agreement share an assumption of sufficient information to specify the
classical boundary separating S from its environment E in order to operationally identify
S, and hence in order to arrive at a consensus that observable properties are properties of
S. Such a classical boundary must be assumed even if the observers are allowed to directly
manipulate and hence “prepare” S before making their observations. A prior agreement
specifying the classical boundary separating S from E amounts, however, to a shared as-
sumption that S has already “emerged” as an objective system. From this it is concluded
that QD cannot, as formulated, account for the emergence of the classical world.
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2 Definitions and operational setting
The OPZ definition of objectivity assumes the existence of a “physical system” S and at
least two “observers” O1 and O2 . The meanings of the terms “system” and “observer”
are left implicit in QD. Zurek remarks at the end of his “rough guide” to decoherence
that “a compelling explanation of what the systems are - how to define them given, say,
the overall Hamiltonian in some suitably large Hilbert space - would undoubtedly be most
useful” (p. 1818 of [5]). In later papers introducing QD, Zurek assumes as “axiom(o)” of
quantum mechanics that “systems exist” (p. 746 of [1]; p. 3 of [8]). This emphasis on
the existence of systems, together with the stated goal of explaining the emergence of an
“objective classical world” quoted above, renders two variant interpretations of the OPZ
definition highly implausible in the context of QD. One variant interpretation is to regard
“objectivity” as associated with “properties” only and to regard “systems” as remaining
non-objective. This variant interpretation of OPZ may be consistent with an instrumentalist
interpretation of quantum mechanics (cf. [14, 15]), but in such an approach “the real
world ... is taken for granted” (p. 7 of [15]), so “emergence” is not a phenomenon to
be explained and the OPZ definition itself is irrelevant. A second variant interpretation
is to regard the “system” as the universe as a whole, and hence as an already-objective
entity for which the notion of “emergence” does not apply. In this variant interpretation,
however, there is no environment, so both the concept of decoherence and most of the
formalism of QD are unneccessary. In the present discussion, therefore, the OPZ definition is
interpreted in the most straightforward and literal way, as providing an operational criterion
for the “emergence” of both properties and the systems that they characterize as “objective”.
Interpreting the OPZ definition in this way and regarding QD as a proposed explanation of
the “emergence” of both properties and systems into “objectivity” is consistent both with
“axiom(o)” and with Zurek’s statement that “preferred states of S become objective” by
the mechanisms of QD (p. 182 of [3]). For the present purposes, moreover, the systems of
interest will be assumed to be macroscopic.
“Observers” are implicitly characterized by the OPZ definition as entities capable of arriving
at a consensus, making prior agreements, having prior knowledge, and having “access” to
the system S. Within QD, observers are distinguished from apparatus by their ability
to “readily consult the content of their memory” (p. 759 of [1]) and are assumed to be
much smaller than the environment E [1, 7, 3] but are otherwise uncharacterized. The
“emergence” of observers is not discussed explicitly; however, Zurek raises the question
of whether QD is “in some way behind the familiar natural selection” (p. 188 of [3]),
a question that has been pursued by Durt [16]. It is assumed here that observers are
macroscopic physical systems and hence within the scope of the OPZ definition; under this
assumption, circularity can be avoided provided that any pair of observers can conclude
that any third observer is “objective” using the methods of QD within the restrictions on
prior knowledge and prior agreement imposed by the OPZ definition.
Provided that the variant interpretation of S as the universe as a whole is ruled out as
discussed above, the existence of the environment E is implicit in the OPZ definition. In
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QD, E is assumed to be arbitrarily large (i.e. to have arbitrarily many quantum degrees
of freedom) and to interact with any systems “immersed” in it, including S, O1 and O2
[1, 7, 3]. For the purposes of practical calculations, E is typically taken to comprise only
specific kinds of degrees of freedom, e.g. the degrees of freedom of the ambient photon field
(e.g. [17]).
The OPZ definition explicitly forbids “prior knowledge” and “prior agreement” on the part
of O1 and O2 . However, certain prior agreements between O1 and O2 must be assumed
in order to define the operational setting to which the OPZ definition refers. In particular,
O1 and O2 must recognize each other as observers in order to “arrive at a consensus”;
they must also be assumed to agree that they have been provided, e.g. by an unspecified
oracle, with a single (quantum-mechanical) description of S or set of (quantum-mechanical)
tools for identifying S. What is critical to the OPZ definition and to the project of QD as
an explanation of the emergence of classicality from minimal quantum mechanics alone is
that O1 and O2 have no prior shared classical criteria with which to identify S, since the
availability of any shared classical criterion sufficient to identify S would imply that S had
already “emerged” into classical objectivity. Hence O1 and O2 cannot, for example, point
to S and say “that is the system of interest.” Indeed the project of QD is to explain how
it is possible for observers to point to anything and agree that it is “objective”, i.e. that it
has “emerged” from the quantum into the classical realm.
3 Observation within the framework of QD
The QD framework for describing the interaction between the observers O1 and O2 and
the system S involves three distinct mechanisms. First, S interacts with the environment
E via a Hamiltonian HS−E . This S − E interaction einselects as “pointer” states of S the
eigenstates {|sk〉} ofHS−E [1, 4, 5]. Second, these eigenstates of S are “witnessed” and hence
encoded in E [6, 7]. Third, the encoding of |sk〉 in E propagates outward from the locus of
interaction into multiple disjoint fragments Fi of E under the action of the environmental
self-Hamiltonian HE [2, 3, 7]. Each observer Oi is restricted to a single fragment Fi . It
is assumed both that the Fi are mutually dynamically decoupled, and that information
does not flow backwards from the Fi to S. The measurements carried out by Oi within
Fi therefore have no effect either on any Fj with j 6= i or on S; hence both the outward
propagation of the environmental encoding and the measurement interactions themselves
can be considered classical [2, 3, 7]. This assumption restricts observers to non-destructive
measurements, and justifies use of a reduced density matrix formalism in which each Oi
traces out all Fj with j 6= i. Under these conditions, the degrees of freedom of Fi with which
Oi interacts can be considered as an Oi -specific macroscopic “apparatus” Ai that encodes
the pointer state |sk〉 of S by classical correlation. As this “apparatus” is restricted by
the einselection and environmental witnessing mechanisms to encoding only eigenstates of
HS−E , it can be viewed as a classical physical implementation of an Oi -specific generalized
observable for S that incorporates the interaction HS−E .
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In the context of the OPZ definition, this framework introduces what amounts to a prior
agreement among the observers: the Oi agree to regard E as separable into the Fi plus the
region immediately surrounding S. This is effectively an agreement that E enforces strong
decoherence; any (quantum) information encoded only in some Fj with j 6= i is effectively
“lost” to Oi . Because this is a prior agreement about E , not about S, it is not ruled out
by the OPZ definition’s restrictions on prior agreements. It is noteworthy, however, that
this prior agreement renders the “apparatus” Ai with which Oi determines the state of
S inaccessible to the other observers and hence nonobjective under the OPZ definition.
This nonobjectivity of the observer-specific “apparatus” is the analog within QD of the
“personal” probabilities for outcomes stressed by the quantum Bayesian approach [15]. It
entails that observers can share outcomes but not observations.
It was shown in [18] that under the above conditions of observation, and without further
assumptions concerning S, O1 and O2 cannot determine on the basis of non-destructive
measurements and quantum-mechanical calculations alone whether indistinguishable out-
comes A1 and A2 obtained from A1 and A2 respectively are redundant encodings of a single
pointer state |sk〉 of a single system S, or encodings of distinct pointer states |sk〉 and |s
′
k
〉
of distinct systems S and S ′ that merely happen, due to the choices of A1 and A2 , to be
indistinguishable. Two observers O1 and O2 cannot, therefore, employ observations of in-
distinguishable and hence apparently redundant encodings in their accessible fragments of
E to identify S. The reason for this is clear: restricted as they are to the Fi , none of which
contain degrees of freedom that interact directly with S, the observers cannot get “close
enough” to S to unambiguously demonstrate that the properties they are observing are
properties of S. They are, therefore, unable to demonstrate that the environmental encod-
ings of these properties are redundant; they must jointly assume encoding redundancy in
order to jointly identify S, in violation of the OPZ restriction on “prior agreement” among
observers. Providing O1 and O2 with observer-specific implementations of a generalized
observable for states of S is, without this assumption of encoding redundancy, insufficient to
start the process of consensus-building contemplated by the OPZ definition of objectivity.
4 Assuming encoding redundancy is equivalent to
assuming a classical boundary
Given the need for a prior assumption of encoding redundancy, the operational question
posed in the Introduction becomes the question of how much information about S this
prior assumption entails, and whether this information can reasonably be regarded as a
“given” in a purely quantum mechanical theory that is intended to explain the emergence
of a classical world. In order to address this question, we consider what information O1
and O2 would require in order to demonstrate encoding redundancy. The Ai with which
the observers interact are by assumption classical encodings, so demonstrating that the Ai
are redundant encodings requires demonstrating that they are classically correlated. The
observers have no access to each other’s Ai , however, so they cannot use jointly-observed
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manipulations of the Ai to demonstrate their classical correlation. They can demonstrate
correlation between the Ai only by demonstrating, by calculation, that the Ai specifically,
and hence jointly, encode the pointer states of S. Such a calculation requires the ability to
calculate the pointer states of S. It is precisely such a calculation of pointer states that QD
provides the formal tools to perform. The question of interest is what must be assumed in
order to use these tools.
Suppose that O1 and O2 are provided, as prior knowledge, with a Hilbert-space decom-
position HS ⊗ HE that explicitly enumerates the degrees of freedom of S and implicitly
specifies the degrees of freedom of E . For example, suppose that S is “given” as one mole
of Au atoms, with position and excitation degrees of freedom, and E is specified to be
the ambient visible-spectrum photon field. From this specification, O1 and O2 can infer
that the interaction HS−E is visible photon scattering from Au atoms, can infer that the
self-interaction HS is at low enough energy to preserve atomic structure, and can assure
themselves that HS−E and HS at least approximately commute as required by QD [7].
However, this specification does not permit calculation of a unique set of pointer states for
S; it does not distinguish photon scattering from a fully-dispersed gas of Au from photon
scattering from a solid block of Au. Hence knowledge of the Hilbert-space decomposition
is insufficient to demonstrate encoding redundancy in the Ai , and therefore insufficient for
a consensus between O1 and O2 that S is an objective system.
One of four distinct kinds of information is required, in addition to the Hilbert-space de-
composition, to enable calculation of a set of expected pointer states of S:
1. The full initial state vector for S in some appropriate basis, or the set of all amplitudes
αi with |αi|
2 ≥ ǫ for some suitable ǫ.
2. A complete set of matrix elements 〈si|HS |sj 〉, or the set of all matrix elements larger
than some suitable ǫ.
3. A complete set of matrix elements 〈si|HS−E |ej 〉, or the set of all matrix elements larger
than some suitable ǫ.
4. A minimal closed macroscopic spatial boundary BS such that all degrees of freedom
of S can be regarded as inside BS and all degrees of freedom of E can be regarded as
outside BS .
The first three kinds of information are purely quantum-mechanical, and hence involve
no prior assumptions about the objectivity of S. However, none of these kinds of infor-
mation can be obtained by observers restricted to environmental fragments Fi containing
no degrees of freedom that interact directly with S, i.e. they cannot be obtained within
the observational framework of QD except by a priori assumption. The fourth kind of
information is classical; the existence of a minimal closed macroscopic spatial boundary BS
straightforwardly violates the uncertainty principle. Nonetheless, it is precisely this fourth
kind of information that is actually used in typical QD calculations. The most realistic
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available model of decoherence and pointer-state encoding by the photon field, for exam-
ple, treats macroscopic dust particles as fully characterized by mass, permittivity constant
and center-of-mass position [17]. While the mass of a dust particle could be calculated from
a specification of its quantum degrees of freedom (e.g. its atomic composition), its electrical
permittivity and center-of-mass position depend on macroscopic boundary conditions that
could only be determined by classical measurements.
The assumption by observers of a classical boundary for S clearly violates the restrictions
on “prior agreement” made by the OPZ definition, as such an assumption amounts to
an assumption of classical objectivity. In the absence of an oracle that provides O1 and
O2 with either state-vector amplitudes or interaction matrix elements, O1 and O2 must
interact directly with S to obtain the information necessary to demonstrate encoding re-
dundancy. Such interactions require a relaxation of the QD framework for observation,
and in particular disallow the assumption of separability that justified the use of reduced
density matrices and rendered the Ai effectively classical. The manipulations of S required
to determine either state-vector amplitudes or interaction matrix elements will in general
not commute with HS−E , and manipulations performed by O1 will in general not commute
with manipulations performed by O2 . Hence even if the observational framework of QD
is relaxed to permit direct system-observer interactions, O1 and O2 cannot demonstrate
to each other either that they are manipulating the same system S, or that the system
that they are manipulating is the same system that they were previously observing from a
distance. Suppose, for example, that O1 leaves her distant environmental fragment F1 to
perform a “preparation” operation P1 on S at some time t, with [P1 , HS−E ] 6= 0, while O2
remains in F2 and interacts only with A2 as before. From the perspective of O1 , the state
of S immediately after the operation with P1 is some eigenstate of P1 . From the perspective
of O2 , the state of S at t +∆t, where ∆t is the decoherence time, is an eigenstate |sm〉 of
HS−E distinct from the eigenstate |sk〉 observed before O1 ’s operation with P1 . This new
eigenstate |sm〉 cannot be observed by O1 , who is interacting directly with S, not with a
distant environmental fragment. In this situation, O1 and O2 are not making observations
in the same basis, and hence cannot directly compare the states that they are observing;
they therefore have even less evidence that they are observing the same system S than
they had when they were restricted to distant but comparable observations from F1 and
F2 . Faced with this inability to unambiguously identify S by observations, O1 and O2 are
forced, if they are to conclude anything at all, to jointly assume that they are manipulating
and observing the same system. This assumption is, however, equivalent to the original
assumption of encoding redundancy. Hence even if the restrictions on interaction with S
imposed by QD are fully relaxed to permit arbitrary “preparations” of S, O1 and O2 can-
not demonstrate encoding redundancy unless they abandon experiments and assume either
state-vector amplitudes or interaction matrix elements a priori, as given by an oracle. Such
complete quantum information is, however, not a reasonable “given”; it is the information
experimental science is supposed to obtain, not the information with which it is allowed to
start.
In actual practice, a joint assumption by observers that they are manipulating the same
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system is typically formulated as an assumption that any manipulations carried out within
a particular bounded region of space are manipulations of the system of interest. As noted
above, any such assumption violates the uncertainty principle, is therefore a classical as-
sumption, and would be disallowed by the OPZ definition as an unacceptable “prior agree-
ment” about S. It is clear, however, that any assumption that independent manipulations
are manipulations of the same system, however formulated, is operationally equivalent to
the assumption of a classical system boundary, a boundary inside of which the system being
manipulated is assumed to be. A classically demarcated and hence in some sense “visible”
boundary justifies an assumption of encoding redundancy, and hence justifies the conclu-
sion that observed effects are observed effects on the same system. In the specific case of
manipulations performed on macroscopic measurement apparatus, such assumptions are,
as Bohr [22] made clear, the foundation upon which the experimental analysis of quantum
states is based.
5 Conclusion
This paper considered an operational question: is it possible for two observers O1 and O2
to “arrive at a consensus” about the eigenstates of a macroscopic quantum system S given
only quantum-mechanical descriptions of S and its states and only quantum-mechanical
methods for discovering further information about S, and is it possible for them to do this
“without prior knowledge” and “without prior agreement” about S or its states, as required
by the OPZ definition of objectivity? The answer to this question is “no”: observers must
assume a classical boundary separating S from its environment E to even begin the process
of characterizing S. This is true whether O1 and O2 are restricted to making observations
of S “from a distance” as they are in QD, or allowed to interact directly with S, i.e. to
prepare S in various ways.
If a classical boundary for S must be assumed from the outset, S must be regarded as
“objective”, and in particular as objectively within its classical boundary, from the outset.
Hence the OPZ definition, by referring to a “physical system” that is “accessible to many
observers” is assuming what it is attempting to operationally define, that is, classical ob-
jectivity. The claim that QD provides an explanation of how systems can satisfy the OPZ
definition of objectivity and hence “emerge” as classical is, therefore, too strong. What QD
in fact explains is how a system that has already emerged into classicality remains clas-
sical. The demonstration by Zurek and Paz that decoherence enforces classicality on the
chaotic orbit of Hyperion [12, 19, 20, 21] exemplifies such a post hoc explanation; a classical
initial state for Hyperion with a classical spatial boundary at which decoherence acts is as-
sumed, not calculated from quantum-mechanical first principles. For macroscopic systems
embedded in the environment, first-principles calculations to demonstrate an “emergence”
into classicality cannot be made, not because an appropriate formalism is unavailable but
because the information needed to employ this formalism cannot be obtained in an obser-
vational framework that does not permit classical assumptions. Absent an ability to define
them from quantum-mechanical first principles, macroscopic systems can be picked out as
8
“systems” only by a priori assumption, by taking them as “given” either by an oracle or
by classical observations. In his lifelong insistence on this point, Bohr [22] was right.
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